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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CREST MOTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff-respondent~

Case No.
9958

vs.
ALEXANDER S. FISH,
Defendant-appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover
damages alleged to have accrued when a Cadillac automobile purchased by the plaintiff through the defendant turned out to have been stolen. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was an independent car
dealer in Dteroit, Michigan, and that the Cadillac
automobile was purchased from the defendant as owner
of the car and as such dealer. The defendant contended
that the car was purchased by the plaintiff himself with
3
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the defendant acting only as a factor-agent for the
plaintiff in finding and negotiating with the owner for
the purchase of the Cadillac automobile concerned and
that as factor;,agent the defendant is not liable to the
plaintiff for the imperfect title.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Ray VanCott, Jr., found in favor of the plaintiff in the
sum of $8,185.15 plus costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and prays that the defendant be awarded
judgment of no cause of action as to the plaintiff's
complaint in that on the basis of evidence adduced at
the trial the judgment is contrary to the law and the
facts.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during 1961 the plaintiff and defendant
orally agreed in Detroit, Michigan, at the home of the
defendant to enter into a relationship whereby the defendant would act for the plaintiff in finding cars for
the plaintiff to purchase. (Page 46-48 transcript). The
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parties entered into a course of dealing based upon this
agreement from 1961 until approximately February,
1962, during which time the defendant located automobiles owned by third parties but which were available for the plaintiff to purchase or for the defendant
to purchase for the plaintiff. Over this period the
defendant located some 25 to 30 automobiles which
were bought by the plaintiff or which the defendant
bought for the plaintiff, all of whic hwere shipped from
Detroit to Salt Lake City for the plaintiff. In some of
these cases the plaintiff called the defendant and asked
him to locate or procure for the plaintiff a certain type
of automobile. (Page 46 transcript). On other instances
the defendant, knowing of the plaintiff's needs, would
call the plaintiff and inform him that a certain car was
available. The plaintiff exercised control as to whether
or not the car asked for by the plaintiff or suggested
by the defendant was purchased and upon what terms.
(Page 36 transcript). In no instance did the defendant
ever have title in his name to any of the cars, nor did
he own any of them and his possession of them was
always temporary in nature for the purposes of the
agency. (Page 21 transcript). Furthermore, in no
case did the defendant buy any such car for himself
prior to the purchase for and delivery to the plaintiff.
In the majority of situations in the defendant's dealing
with the plaintiff the automobiles were purchased directly from used car dealers in Detroit with the plaintiff mailing the purchase money for the cars in the form
of a draft made out to the name of the said owner-

5
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dealer. The defendant in these cases merely found
the automobiles, negotiated the price, aranged transfer
of title directly from the owner-dealer to the plaintiff
and shipped the car to the plaintiff. (Page 56 transcript). In a few instances the money was mailed to
the defendant in his name and to his own bank account.
This occurred in those minority situations where the
car owner was other than a used car dealer and the
defendant had to use his own funds to accomplish the
purchase.
Prior to February, 1962, the plaintiff called the
defendant in Detroit and told him that he wanted a
late model Cadillac automobile for his personal use.
(Page 51 transcript). This was to be a Sedan DeVille
or a Fleetwood with air conditioning. The defendant
thereupon contacted dealers in Detroit advising them
of his desire to find such an automobile. The defendant
thereafter was called by a Lincoln used car manager,
named Mr. Y oungham, who informed him that he knew
of a Cadillac car the defendant might be interested in.
The owner of the Cadillac, Mr. Ted Cox, was then
sent by Mr. Youngham with his automobile to the
defendant's office. The defendant called the plaintiff
and advised him of the 1960 Cadillac that the defendant
could get for the plaintiff. The defendant also sug·
gested that a Chevrolet was still available and that he
could have them both and they would help to make
up a load for shipment to Salt Lake. The plaintiff
then told the defendant to go ahead and see what he
could do after he had been told the cost would be
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$3,000.00 for both cars, broken down as $2,500.00 for
the Cadillac, $400.00 for the Chevrolet and $100.00

for the defendant as commission or fee. The defendant
then asked Mr. Cox to produce the title to the Cadillac
and the defendant checked the serial number on the
title against the serial number stamped on a plate
fastened to the automobile door and he found they
were the same. He then asked Mr. Cox to identify
himself to insure that he was the owner shown on the
title. He so identified himself.
Upon checking the title the defendant noted that
the owner, Mr. Cox, had only paid some $80.00 sales
tax on the car which indicated that he had bought it
for approximately $2,000.00. This made the defendant
suspicious so he called the Detroit Police Auto Squad
to see if anything was wrong with the car or the record
title. The Sergeant of Police advised the defendant
he would check the car out and would call back. The
defendant then called the plaintiff and told of his concern about the car's title and that the Detroit Police
were checking into it. He also told the plaintiff not
to wire him the purchase price until he called him back.
About 4:30 p.m. the Sergeant called the defendant
and said the car was okay. He said, however, that the
address given by the seller, Mr. Cox, was in an area
where wrecked automobiles were repaired so he had
better check to make sure he wasn't buying a wreck
but that otherwise nothing derogatory appeared against
the car or the title.
7
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The defendant then had a nearby Lincoln dealer
put the Cadillac upon a hoist and they checked the
car for evidence of its being wrecked. No such evidence
was found. The defendant then telephoned the plaintiff
and told him the police had cleared the title and it was
not a wreck and to go ahead and wire the money. The
plaintiff was informed that the seller, Mr. Cox, wanted
his money right then and therefore the defendant would
issue him his personal check to secure the deal but that
the plaintiff should be sure to send the money to his
account quickly because the defendant didn't have
enough money in his account to cover such a check. The
defendant then wrote into the record title the name of
the plaintiff as the buyer and Mr. Cox signed the title
as seller-owner and the defendant notarized the seller's
signature. At no time was. title to the car in the name
of the defendant nor did he ever possess it as owner.
The seller was told not to cash the check until the next
day, when the money from the plaintiff would reach
the account of the defendant. The seller, Mr. Cox,
departed with the defendant's check, leaving the car
in the possession of the defendant. The money from
the plaintiff did not arrive the next day and Mr. Cox
kept checking with the defendant to see why not.
Finally the money reached the defendant's account
after the defendant had called the plaintiff to see if
it had been sent and the check was then presented to
the defendant's -bank by Mr. Cox and was honored
out of funds sent by the plaintiff. The car was then
shipped by the defendant from Detroit to the plaintiff
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in Salt Lake City on a railroad flat car along with
the Chevrolet and other cars belonging to the plaintiff
and other car dealers in Utah.
The defendant is not a dealer buying and selling
cars in Michigan. (Page 44 transcript). To do so
under Michigan law he would have to be licensed and
would take title in his name and possession of the cars
concerned as owner and would pay sales taxes upon
the cars when he acquired them. Instead, the defendant
found cars for the plaintiff and negotiated with the
owner, either a dealer or as in this case a private indi\ridual, to purchase the cars for the plaintiff. (Page 46
transcript). The defendant took only temporary possessions of the cars, checked the titles, bought them
for the plaintiff when told to do so and shipped them.
As compensation for this the defendant received a fee
on the transportation of the cars to the plaintiff in the
form of drive-away or rail deliveries. These fees fluctuated upon various circumstances. Further, if the
purchase itself was a favorable one, the defendant took
a variable commission from the actual seller-buyer
purchase price. In the case at hand this was $100.00
for the two cars bought by the plaintiff for $3,000.00.
This conunission was compensation for finding the cars
for the plaintiff and negotiating the purchase by the
plaintiff from the owners.
The plaintiff testified that while in Detroit he
had purchased two cars from the defendant at the
defendant's home. This was not the case, however, as

9
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those cars belonged to a. used car dealer who had a lot
adjacent to the defendant's home and the defendant
did not own or possess those cars but bought them from
the dealer when the plaintiff said he wanted them and
gave the defendant the money to buy them. (Page 57
transcript) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE
CADILLAC AUTOMOBILE CONCERNED IN
THIS MATTER WAS THAT OF PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT IN THAT THE SAID AUTOMOBILE WAS PROCURED BY THE DEFENDANT AS A FACTOR FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF.
It is considered that the record clearly discloses
that the defendant served as agent-factor of the plaintiff in the purchase of the 1960 Cadillac automobile
concerned herein. All essential elements of such relationship are established. Restatement of Agency, 2nd
Edition, Section 14, states: "One who contracts to acquire property from a third person and convey it to
another is the agent of the other only if it is agreed
that he is to act primarily for the benefit for the other
and not himself. Typical situations of this is the purchase of land through a broker. Factors indicating no
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agency are ( 1) that he is to receive a fixed price for
the property irrespective of the price paid by him. ( 2)
that he acts in his own name and receives title to the
property which he is thereafter to transfer. (3) that
he has an independent business in buying and selling
similar property."
In the case at hand the defendant did not receive
a fixed price for the property irrespective of the price
paid. (Pages 37, 63, 64 transcript). His fee or commission fluctuated depending upon the circumstances
of the sale, the time of year and whether or not a particularly good price was negotiated for the plaintiff.
Secondly, the defendant did not act in his own name
and he never received title or ownership of the cars
involved. Both the owner-seller and the plaintiff knew
this. Mr. Cox was notified that he had to wait until
funds came from the plaintiff before he could cash
defendant's check. The plaintiff knew the defendant
was not selling cars himself for drafts were usually
mailed made out directly to dealers in Detroit. (Pages
27, 72 transcript). }""'~urther, plaintiff knew that in no
case did defendant appear as owner on any titles. It
was thus known to both parties that the defendant
merely negotiated the purchase for the plaintiff. The
plaintiff testified (page 20 transcript) that in no instance did he send money to Mr. Fish in Mr. Fish's
name. The plaintiffs money was always used exclusively
and the transaction was not consummated in the case
at hand until the plaintiff's draft reached the account
of the defendant. Thirdly, it is clear that the defendant

11
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had no independent business in buying and selling
automobiles. He never took title to cars he negotiated
for and he never owned any he negotiated for.
The plaintiff (page 13 transcript) testified that
it is a usual practice for automobile dealers not to have
title to cars they were selling. The plaintiff is a dealer
in Utah and this may be the case in Utah or at least
his opinion of it, but it is apparent that such is not the
case under the laws of Michigan, where these transactions took place. The Compiled Laws of Michigan,
Motor Vehicle Title, reflects this. Section 256.101
defines a dealer as any person engaged in the purchase
and sale of motor vehicles. Section 256.103 provides
that the owner must transfer title on the back of the
record title to the purchaser and deliver title to him.
The purchaser or transferee, unless such person is a
dealer licensed under Section 14, shall within 10 days
present the title to the Secretary of State accompanied
by a $1.00 fee for issuance of a new title. Section
256.104 provides that failure to adhere to these provisions is a misdemeanor. Section 256.114 provides it
shall be unlawful for any person to carry on or conduct
the business of buying or selling motor vehicles unless
and until he shall have received a license from the Secretary of State authorizing the carrying on or conducting of such business. Such li_cense shall be furnished
annually. Section 256.2 states that every dealer in new
or second hand vehicles· shall before delivering any
motor vehicle to a purchaser make application to the
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Secretary of State for a new title and pay sales tax
thereon.
The defendant was not licensed in Michigan. (Page
transcript) . He did not pay sales taxes or arrange
for issuance of new titles on cars and held none in his
own name as buyer or seller. Instead it is clear from
his relationship with the plaintiff that he located cars
for and on behalf of the plaintiff but did not buy them
for himself for he took no title, secured no new titles
and paid no sales tax. Inasmuch as he was not a dealer
but only an agent who negotiated for the purchase of
the car between the owner-seller and the plaintiff-buyer,
using in every case the funds of the plaintiff, he did
not have to be licensed or pay taxes.
~5

As to the automobile concerned herein the testimony is that the plaintiff told the defendant he wanted
a particular type of automobile he could use for himself and the defendant was to find such a car. (Page
51, (transcript). It is evident the plaintiff didn't himself have one for sale, otherwise the deal could have
been consummated the moment the plaintiff's desire was
made known. The defendant then started searching for
such a car as both parties knew he would have ·to do.
It is admitted that the defendant had substantial freedom and independence. in the methods he used to find
this car and others. (Page 48 transcript). Once a car
was located and negotiations were commenced the defendant used his best efforts to obtain a favorable price
with the planitiff exercising ultimate control over the

13
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purchase of the car. The plaintiff clearly did not control
the detailed hour to hour actions of the defendant but
this does not make him any the less the agent of the
plaintiff. Restatement of the Law of Agency, 2nd
Edition, Section 53, states: "The phrases to buy and
to sell are ambiguous. The language used in connection
with them, the relation of the parties, the usages of the
business of the principal or agent and other circumstances determine what meaning is to be given to them.
An agent of a non-resident principal is likely to have
wider authority than if the principal is nearby. On the
other hand the fact that the business of the agent is
primarily that of soliciting indicates that he is authorized to do more than find a customer."
Noteworthy in this regard is American Juris prudence, Brokers, Section 4. There is summarized the
view that a broker is an agent but as to his physical
activities he is an independent contractor. (Emphasis
added) . Section 9, American Jurisprudence, Factors,
states that ordinarily the authority of a factor with
respect to merchandise is that of a general agent but
he may not buy goods for his principal unless he is
specifically directed to do so. The circumstances of
the agency exhibited between the plaintiff and the defendant clearly fits these general statements. Section 2,
American Jurisprudence, Brokers, provides that as
generally defined a broker is an agent who, for a commission or brokerage fee, bargains or carries on negotiations in behalf of his principal as an intermediary
between the latter and third persons in transacting
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business relative to the sale or purchase of any form
of property the custody of which is not intrusted to
him for the purpose of discharging his agency. Section
6, American Juris prudence, Factors, then states that
a factor is an agent intrusted with possession and he
not only negotiates the contract of sale or purchase but
is in duty bound to carry such contract through to performance in behalf of his principal. The character of
factor and broker is sometimes combined (emphasis
added) where the broker has possession of what he is
employed to sell or is empowered to obtain possession
of what he is employed to purchase, although properly
speaking he is, in these cases, a factor. A factor may
sell goods in his own name without disclosing that of
his principal.
Also probative is the comment in 35 Corpus Juris
Secondum, Section lc. There it states that a factor is
an agent who, in pursuance of his usual trade or business and for a commission or factorage, sells goods
consigned or intrusted to his possession for that purpose
by the owner. Although a factor usually sells goods
the agency may include the purchase of goods. Section
le. provides that the relationship of principal and factor
is one of agency and in order to preserve the relationship it is not necessary that the factor advertise the
fact of his agency to his customer.
Corpus Juris Secundum, Brokers, Section 4, points
out that a factor is entrusted with possession, control
in disposal of property and may buy it in his own name

15
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(emphasis added) and bind the principal whereas a
broker usually is not entrusted with custody and is not
authorized to buy in his own name. One may combine
features of both factor and broker as being empowered
to take possession of that which he is employed to purchase.
Despite a considerable search no case has been
found involving a purchase of a motor vehicle by an
agent-factor or broker. Other cases have been located,
however, which are considered to be controlling as to
the law applicable in the case at hand. Noteworthy in
this regard is the case of Twohig vs. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 118 F Supp. 322. There the plaintiff entered
into an agreement with the Mid States Packing Company under which plaintiff became an agent for the
purpose of purchasing cattle for the Packing Company
on a commission basis. The plaintiff was to advance the
purchase price for his principal and the principal would
then reimburse the plaintiff. In complying with this
arrangement the plaintiff purchased some cattle for
the Packing Company and he shipped them by railroad
according to instructions of the principal. As to the
nature of the relationship concerned between the plaintiff and the Packing Company the Court held this was
one wherein the plaintiff was an agent of the Packing
Company for the purpose of buying cattle. The Court
enumerated the incidents of their relationship which
indicated the legal status of principal-agent. These
were ( 1) the plaintiff was to receive a commission per
head of cattle bought. The Court opined as to this that
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owner-sellers do not receive commiSSions or fees for
services but agents do. ( 2) Plaintiff shipped the cattle
to the principal and the plaintiff was not shown as the
owner of record. ( 3) Plaintiff did not hold title to the
cattle or exercise any control after shipment. The cattle
were delivered by truckers by receipt of the principal
only. No bills of lading or other devices were used by
the plaintiff to retain dominion over the cattle once
delivered to the carrier. It was contemplated by the
parties in this arrangement, and followed in practice,
that after delivery of the cattle to the carrier full dominion over them was in the principal.
It is submitted that the Twohig case is strikingly
similar to the cas.e at hand and that as to all essential
elements of agency they are identical. In both cases
the agent-factor, who purchased or arranged for the
purchase of personalty, was to and did receive a commission or fee for their actions. In neither case was
the agent-buyer the owner of the personalty nor did
they appear as owner on the records of title and they
had possession temporarily only for the purpose of
shipment and carrying out duties of the agency. In
both cases the principal was shown on documents and
records of title as the owner of the rnaterial purchased,
not the agent, and the agent exercised no dominion or
control over said property once put into the hands of
a shipper or carrier for delivery to or on behalf of the
principal.
Likewise probative is the case of Bashford vs. A.
LeYy & J. Zentner Co., 11 P 2d 51. There a contract
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was entered into between plaintiff and defendant under
which plaintiff was to solicit and find fresh fruits for
the defendant on terms approved by the defendant.
Plaintiff was then to pack and load the fruits at his
own expense and ship the same to or as directed by
defendant. The defendant for this service was to pay
the plaintiff the regular commercial packing rates for
fruit purchased, packed and loaded, out of which he
received his commission or fee. The above payment
was to include the costs of purchase of the fruit plus
those for packing and shipment and this payment was
to be made when the cars were loaded. The defendant
advanced the plaintiff money for expenses and these
advances were to be periodically deducted from packing
charges paid at $50.00 per car. The Court held that
this arrangement was that of principal-agent with the
plaintiff holding the status of agent of the defendant
for the purpose of buying fruit and shipping the same
to or at the behest of the defendant. The Court further
held that the defendant had improperly and without
cause terminated this agency agreement and was liable
to the plaintiff for damages. The Court said in this
regard, "This leaves for our consideration the question
of whether or not the plaintiff violated the duties which
an agent owes to his principal to such an extent that
defendant was justified in terminating the agency and
ending plaintiff's rights under the agreement." It was
held as to this that the plaintiff had exercised reasonable
care and skill and although some fruits were lost or
damaged in shipment he was exonerated for he did
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not have to make a "perfect" pack but was required
only to adhere to the standards usual and customary
in the trade. The Court also held that the plaintiff-agent
was not restricted under the agreement to working
exclusively for the defendant-principal but that he
might also buy for others too.
It is also submitted that the Bashful case is on
all fours as to the major aspects and factors of agency
to the case at hand. In both cases a commission was
to be paid out of packing and shipping expenses. In
both the agent-factor was to locate and purchase or
arrange for the purchase by the principal of personal
property and to ship the same. In both the funds used
were those of the principal although it's clear the agent
could use his own funds too. The goods in both cases
were purchased for the principal and title to the same
was in the principal. Further it should be noted in both
cases that the_principal did not control the hourly actions of the agent and had real control only as to the
ultimtae terms of purchase.
See also the case of Couturie vs. Roensch, 134 SW
413. There the buyer of cattle was held to be a factoragent even though he received compensation in the
form of a fixed salary and not a commission.
Also of interest is the case of Beakley vs. Rainier,
There the plaintiff had agreed to buy
pecans for the defendant. The defendant refused to
pay for a carload of pecans bought and shipped by
the plaintiff. Judgment was given for the plaintiff but
78 SW 702.
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on appeal this was reversed and remanded. This was
not reversed on the grounds of agency, however, for
the Court held on appeal that the plaintiff was a factoragent of defendant and was entitled to reimbursement
at the average cost of pecans he had bought for the
defendant. The agreement between the parties was to
the effect that plaintiff would buy pecans for the defendant and would ship them. The plaintiff bought some
pecans in his own name, not disclosing his principal
but as factor. The ruling further held that the factor's
lien extends only to the amount owing by the principal
for funds advanced by the factor-agent. What is considered important, however, is the fact that the relationship is basically as it was in the case at hand and the
court opined that the buyer was a factor-agent of the
defendant-principal and that the factor did have lien
rights as to property purchased when the principal
owed him for money advanced for the purchase by the
agent-buyer. The case was remanded for further trial
oii other issues.

POINT II
THAT AS AGENT DEFENDANT ACTED
WITH REASONABLE CARE AND DILIGENCE AND IS NOT LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFECT OF TITLE
TO THE CADILLAC AUTOMOBILE AND
THAT THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
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COURT MADE AT THE TIME OF PRESENT,\TION OF EVIDENCE TO THE COURT
\VAS THAT DEFENDANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT IF THE COURT
FOUND THE DEFENDANT TO BE THE
AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF.
A minor amount of testimony was adduced during
the trial pointing toward the issue of the reasonableness
of the defendant's actions in checking the title to the
Cadillac automobile. It is considered, however, that
more than enough is shown to indicate that the defendant did not use reasonable care and diligence. In
this regard 35 CJS, Section 20, points out that a factor
must ordinarily exercise only reasonable care, skill and
diligence in his dealings for his principal and is respon·
sible only for such losses as result from his failure to
do so. He is not an insurer and he does not guarantee
that he will not commit error. In this regard the plaintiff's witness (page 3 transcript) testified that the usual
and custmary place for checking serial numbers of automobiles was to do just what the defendant did, i.e.,
check the number on the placque screwed on the door
jamb of the automobile. Note as to this that the case
of Bashford vs. A Levy & .J. Zentner Co., supra, held
that a factor-agent would not be liable for loss to his
principal if the agent adhered to the usual and customary standards of care in the trade. See also .Justice
vs. Broch, 131 P 38, where the court said a factor
would be liable for negligence but not errors in judgment and he is not an insurer against mistake.
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In any event this issue is considered to be immaterial for the purposes of this appeal. After the
basic facts as to the actions of the defendant in checking the title were presented to the trial court the court
ruled that the sole question determinative of the case
was whether or not the defendant acted as agent of the
plaintiff with respect to the Cadillac automobile. If
he did Judge VanCott ruled that the defendant would
be entitled to judgment in his favor. Thereafter further
testimony, the oral arguments to the Court and the
trial brief submitted by the defendant concentrated
upon the issue of whether or not an agency relationship
existed between the parties as to said automobile. It is
considered this ruling of the trial court is and was correct and that the defendant is entitled to judgment
if he is the agent of the plaintiff. Should the issue of
reasonable care be considered important or controlling
it is prayed that the matter be remanded to the trial
court for further testimony and argument to the trial
court on the merits of such issue.

CONCLUSION
It i~ believed to be clear in the light of the foregoing cases and general authorities that Mr. Fish acted
as the factor-agent of the plaintiff in finding and negotiating for the purchase by the plaintiff of the Cadillac
automobile concerned herein. All essential elements of
such agency relationship are shown to exist between
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the parties. Payment of a fixed or variable commission;
purchase in the name of the agent or the principal for
personal property to be delivered and shipped to the
principal; use of funds of the principal or funds of the
agent with reimbursement therefor; lack of ownership
or title in the agent and the agent not exercising dominion over the property once shipped without retention of any indicia of title, ownership or control.
That as such agent the defendant is not liable for
the defect of title of the motor vehicle in that the defendant used reasonable care and diligence in the transaction even according to the testimony of the plaintiff's
own expert witness. That in any event at the trial such
issue was not fully explored nor argued and is immaterial as to this appeal.
Wherefore it is prayed that the defendant be held
to be the agent of the plaintiff and that judgment for
the plaintiff be reversed in favor of the defendant.
That in the alternative, should care and diligence be
the determining issue, that the matter be remanded for
further testimony and argument on· said issue.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK FAIRCLOUGH
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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